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1. INTRODUCTION 
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This paper aims to provide a broad overview of the effects of bus service deregulation in Britain, and 
follows a similar revie\v by Roy Turner and myself presented at the First Conference in this series, at Thredbo, 
Australia, in May 1989 (1). The overall trends described in that paper have not changed radically, but the picture 
described then is updated to the present. A wider range of local case studies is OO\V available to supplement the 
aggregate data at national level. 
Of particular concern is the poor financial performance of the industry as a whole, despite the substantial 
fall in unit operating costs. The reasons for this are examined, and possible remedies. 
The British government is now proposing to extend the deregulation process to London (2). Arguments 
for and against this are outlined, and an alternative reform suggested. 
The impact of minibus operation in Britain is examined, and its possible scope else\vhere reviewed. 
Like,vise, scope for deregulation, and/or the London-style competitive tendering system, in other countries is 
examined. Parallels \Vith the experience of deregulation else\vhere, notably in Chile, are also observed. 
Within a paper of this length, only a brief summary of research can be given. However, extensive 
references to more detailed work, both by myself, and other researchers in Britain, are provided to complement 
this outline. 
2. MAJOR CHANGES INTRODUCED ffiROUGH LOCAL BUS DEREGULATION 
Under the Transport Act of 1985, local bus services in Britain* 
were deregulated from October 1986. It followed the deregulation of express coach services under the 
Transport Act of 1980 (3). This process applied to all areas in Great Britain except London (referred to in tables 
as 'GB excluding London' or 'Rest of GB'). Within the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland was also unaffected 
by deregulation. 
Under the deregulated framework, route licensing was replaced by a registration system, in which 
operators notify the Traffic Commissioners in each area of the service(s) they propose to operate. In addition to 
the services operated on a commercial basis, services are provided under contract to local authorities, to cover 
those areas, or - more commonly - times of day, in which commercial operation is not justified. Such services are 
supported through a system of competitive tendering. 
There is no price control on commercial services, although on tendered services local authorities may 
specify fare scales. Concessionary travel - notably by pensioners - plays an important role. This 'concessionary' 
travel is that made at fares specified by the local authorities (such as a half fare, lO\V flat fare, or free travel), which 
differ from those which the operators themselves would charge on a commercial basis. Operators are 
compensated for the net revenue foregone, by local authorities. Local authorities may not provide general 
subsidies to bus operators. 
Deregulation outside London was accompanied by privatization, albeit on a less specific time scale. All 
subsidiaries of the National Bus Company (NBC) which covered much of England and Wales were sold between 
1986 and 1988 (4) and the same process is now being applied to the Scottish Bus Group (SBG). The operators 
O\Vned by Passenger Transport Authorities (PT As) in the metropolitan areas or by local authorities elsewhere 
have been redefined as "arm's length" Passenger Transport Companies (PTCs). Two of the PT A companies 
(Yorkshire Rider and Tyne & Wear) have been sold to management/employee buyouts and several of the other 
local authority companies privatized. The government has recently stated that it proposes, if re-elected, to 
compulsorily privatism all remaining publicly-o,vned fleets. The traditionally private 'independent' sector has 
also expanded its role in local bus service operation as described previously (1 ). 
At present, a different system applies in London, where the controlling authority, London Regional 
Transport (generally kno\vn simply as 'London Transport' or LT) , ensures provision of about one third of bus 
kilometers through a system of competitive tendering, the remainder being operated directly by subsidiaries of 
its own London Buses Ltd (LBL) The distinction between 'commercial' and 'supported' services found else\vhere 
does not apply, and a common fare system applies to the \Vhole network. 
* The term 'Great Britain' is used to cover the entity of England, Scotland and Wales. The term 'United Kingdom' also includes 
Northern Ireland. The Isle of Man and Channel Islands are excluded from both definitions. 
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3. TRENDS IN RIDERSHIP AND AGGREGATE SERVICE LEVELS 
Overall trends since deregulation in passengers carried and bus kilometers run are summarized in table 
1. Table 2 shows the trends in real fares and average revenue per passenger trip. Table 3 shows average operating 
cost per bus-kilometer and per passenger trip, in real terms. Table 4 shows percentage changes in major 
performance indicators. · 
Table 1: Changes in total passengers carried and bus .. kilometers run 
Passenger trips : millions 
percentage change 
Area 1985/6 1988/9 1990/91 85/6 - 88/9 85/6-
89/91 
All Great 
Britain 5,641 5,242 4,851 - 7.2 - 14.0 
All Outside 
London 4,489 4,001 3,654 - 11.0 - 18.6 
Metropolitan 
Areas 2,069 1,695 1,528 - 17.9 - 26.1 
English 
Shires 1,587 1,499 1,396 - 5.9 - 12.0 
Scotland 671 647 583 - 3.6 -13.1 
Wales 163 161 147 - 1.2 - 9.8 
London 1,152 1,240 1,197 + 7.6 + 3.9 
Nonhem 
Ireland 85 82 80* - 3.4 - 5.8• 
Bus kilometers : millions 
percentage change 
Area 1985/6 1988/9 1990/91 85/6 - 88/9 85/6-
89/90 
All Great 
Britain 2,076 2,386 2,444 + 15.1 + 17.7 
All Outside 
London 1,803 2,101 2,140 + 16.6 + 18.7 
Metropolitan 
Areas 575 634 649 + 10.3 + 12.9 
English 
Shires 848 1,023 .. 1,035 + 21.2 + 22.1 
Scotland 285 325 333 +14.0 + 16.8 
Wales 95 118 123 +24.2 + 29.5 
London 273 285 304 + 4.4 + 11.4 
Northern 
Ireland 54 58 60* + 7.0 + 10.6* 
Sources: Bus and Coach Statistics Great Britain 1990/91(HMSO,1991) Tables 1.1 (kilometres) and 2.1 
(passenger trips) 
I 
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Northern Ireland: 'Performance History: Financial Results and Related Statistics' Ulsterbus/Citybus/ 
Flexibus, 1990. 
• Data relates to 1989/90, and percentage change 1985/6-1989-90. 
Table 2: Changes in real fares 
Percentage change 1985/6 to 1990/91 
OnDTp Average 
Fares Index Revenue Per 
Trip 
Metropolitan areas + 32.8 + 24.7 
English Shires + 3.8 + 2.7 
Scotland - 6.2 - 6.7 
London + 11.4 + 1.2 
All Great Britain 
excluding London + 8.7 + 8.7 
Sources: Department of Transport fares index as quoted in ref 5, Table 3.1. 
Average revenue per trip is calculated by dividing all revenue actually received from passengers (excluding CFCs) 
by total trips made. 
Adjustment to 1990/91 by the retail prices index. 
Table 3: Operating cost per bus-kilometer, and per passenger trip: great britain, excluding London 
Pence, at 1990/91 prices 
1985/6 1986/7 1987/8 1988/9 1989/90 1990/91 
Per bus-kilometer 
Excluding depreciation 117 104 89 84 79 77 
Including depreciation - - 93 87 83 79 
Per passenger trip 
Excluding depreciation 47 47 45 45 44 45 
Including depreciation - - 47 47 46 46 
Note: All data deduced from costs per passenger trip Table4.2 in 'Bus and Coach Statistics 1990/91' adjusted 
to 1990/91 prices by reference to the retail prices index. These may therefore differ from the rounded 
data shown in Table 4.1 of that report. 
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Table 4: Changes in major performance indicators 
1985/6 to 1988/89 1985/6 to 1990f.H 
Operating cost per local 
bus-kilometer 
London - 14 - 20 
Rest of GB 
- 30 -36 
Local and 'other' psv-km 
per member of staff 
London (LBL) + 23 + 29 
Rest of GB + 21 +28 
Operating cost per 
local passenger trip 
London - 18 - 16 
Rest of GB - 7 - 6 
Passengers boarding per 
local bus-kilometer 
London + 5 - 5 
Rest of GB - 23 - 30 
Passenger trips per member 
of staff 
London (LBL) + 29 + 21 
Rest of GB - 3 - 8 
Notes: Derived from tables 1.3 (local bus-kilometers and other services, by type of operator); and data in 
tables I and 2 of this paper. 
For estimation of staff productivity in terms of kilometers run, other types of service (contract, private 
hire, tours, express, etc.) are also included, since an estimate of staff employed in local operations as 
such is not available. 
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The year 1985/6 is taken as the base year for comparisons - trends over a longer period being discussed 
in the Thredbo paper (1). The latest year for which comprehensive figures are available is 1989/90 (5). 
It can be seen that bus-kilometers have risen by 17°/o over this period in Britain as a whole. The greatest 
increase has been in Wales at 29o/o; and the English 'Shires', i.e all of England outside London and the six 
metropolitan areas (the 'Mets'), at 22°/o. The net increase roughly corresponds to the volume of kilometers no\v 
run by minibuses, although some minibus \Vorkings have directly replaced kilometers previously run by full-sized 
buses, and additional operation of full-sized buses is also found in some cases. In other area categories, the gro\vth 
in kilometers run is some\vhat lo\ver, and in London (not subject to deregulation) \Vas only 11°/o. 
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However, if one looks at trends in ridership, measured as passenger trips, the opposite picture emerges 
as shown in Figure 2. In the deregulated areas as a whole (outside London) it fell by 18%, whereas in London it 
increased by 4%. In Northern Ireland, the two major operators which account for almost all local scheduled 
services -Ulsterbus and Citybus - experienced a decline of 6%, to 1989/90. · 
The sharpest fall in ridership occurred in the metropolitan areas, at 26%. In the English Shires, Wales 
and Scotland, the fall was about 12%. The reduction in the Mets. took place largely in the 1985 - 1987 period, 
associated with sharp real fare increases in some areas, and severe instability in the pattern of services. In other 
areas, the changes in ridership were more gradual. 
A more detailed examination of the changes to 1987/8 is given in the Thredbo paper (1), and up to 1988/ 
9 in a welfare assessment of deregulation (6). Changes between 1988/9and1989/90 largely maintained previous 
trends. Total ridership in Great Britain excluding London fell by 3o/o, with little variation between areas, 
associated with underlyingfactorssuch as rising car ownership. Between 1989/90and1990/1 a larger fall occurred, 
especially in the Mets )7%, associated with the economic recession. This has continued to affect ridership in 1991/ 
2. 
The fall in ridership between 1985/6 and 1988/9 in the deregulated areas was largely what one would 
expect, if allowing solely for an underlying decline of about 1.5o/o per annum, and the impact of real fare increases 
(primarily in the Mets). However, the substantial increases in bus-kilometers operated would have been expected 
to offset such decline significantly, as a result of higher frequencies and shorter waiting times thereby produced. 
Indeed, such results are confirmed from a number of minibus conversions (see table8). However, such beneficial 
effects appear to be offset by the impact of instability and poor passenger information, leading to losses of 
ridership which cancel out such growth. 
4. TRENDS IN FARES 
Overall, passengers do not appear to have benefitted from deregulation. As table 2 shows, fares have 
risen most sharply in Mets. (albeit from exceptionally low levels) or largely in line with inflation elsewhere (apart 
from a small drop in Scotland) - in contrast with the sharp fare reductions associated with express coach 
deregulation (3). The absence of any ridership level above that which would otherwise have been expected 
suggests no net benefits in terms of service quality (subject to exceptions listed below), given the elasticity of 
demand that would normally be expected to apply. 
Fares indices derived from the Department of Transport (table 2) suggest an overall increase of 8.7% 
in real terms between 1985/6and 1990191. However this index does not necessarily reflect actual trends in average 
revenue per trip (i.e. fares actually paid by passengers divided by all trips, including those on concessionary 
passes). Hence, the real increase is somewhat lower on this indicator than in the DTp index - for example, 25% 
instead of 33o/o for the Mets. The proportion of concessionary travel has grown in many areas, notably in large 
cities. The study for the Association of Metropolitan Authorities by Oxford University (7) suggests that this is 
due not only to population structure changes, but also a sharp drop in ordinary fare-paying traffic due to service 
instability. Unfortunately, consistent published data is not available to show total trips made in this form. 
However, in the London Transport case, it is known that journeys by pensioners on the free travel pass 
rose from 228 million in 1985/6 to 292 million in 1989/90 (8), or by 28% - growing from 20% to 24% of total 
passenger trips. Even this is probably a lower rate of growth in the share of total trips than in other conurbations, 
due to the instability which caused greater loss of fare-paying traffic elsewhere. 
These data enable a more accurate assessment of trends in fare paid per passenger. Dividing total revenue 
paid by passengers by total trips made (including concessionary travel), gives in the London case, a fall of 3.7% 
between 1985/6 and 1989/90. However, if the pensioners' trips are excluded, the figure changes to an increase of 
0.3% (a combination of cash-paid fares rising faster than inflation, largely offset by a continued shift to travelcard 
use). This contrasts with the Department ofTransport's index eif 10.8% over the same period (table 2). 
Using this more precise figure for real revenue per fare-paying passenger, we may calculate 'expected' 
versus 'observed' trips for London, using the same method as employed in earlier papers (1 ), (6). Over the four-
year period 1985/6 to 1989/90, a secular decline of 1.5% per annum would give a compo.und decline of 5.9%, plus 
a marginal -0.1°/o due to the fares effect (on a -0.3 elasticity). However, the increase in bus-kilometers of7.4o/o 
would be expected (on a +0.4 elasticity) to give an overall net reduction of 3.2%. In contrast, the actual increase 
in fare-paying traffic was 1.2%, i.e. actual ridership was about 4 to 5% greater than would have been expected. 
This favorable result contrasts sharply with deregulated areas, in which observed ridership is about 5% less than 
the 'expected' figure when the same elasticities are used (6). Further work by Fairhurst in London (37) and Tyson 
in the Mets (38) confirms these differences. 
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5. TRENDS IN UNIT COST AND PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Tables 3 and 4 show the substantial reductions in unit operating costs which \vould, in principle, enable 
a considerable reduction in public spending, and indeed large falls have occurred in payments to operators. 
However, the substantial growth in bus-kilometers run has meant that total costs have fallen much less, notably 
in the shires. 
The effect of falling ridership and growing bus kilometers is that average loadings have fallen very sharply 
outside London. Taking the trend in passengers boarding per bus kilometer (passenger trips divided by bus 
kilometers) as a proxy for that in average loadings (i.e. assuming the average trip length to be unchanged), the 
reduction was 30% between 1985/86 and 1990/91 (table 4). In London no significant change occurred. Hence, the 
large reduction in operating cost per bus kilometer outside London of 36°/o in real terms over this period translates 
into a reduction of only 6°/o in cost per passenger trip. Figure 3. shows the Operating lasts in Great Britain 
excluding London. 
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FIGURE 3 OPERATING COSTS-
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The reduction in unit operating costs per bus-kilometer may be attributed to a number of factors: 
- an exogenous fall in real fuel cost per liter of 48% between 1985/6 and 1990/91 (39). 
- a reduction in real weekly earnings per member of staff. For drivers and conductors - the only 
category for which a specific index is available - the fall between April 1986 and April 1991was13% 
(9). This represents a transfer payment from bus workers to other groups, rather than a net economic 
gain. Between 1985/6 and 198819 such reduced earnings produced total savings of about £100 million 
(6). In addition, some losses in terms of benefits (sick pay, holidays, paid meal breaks etc.) should 
also be added. 
- an increase in staff productivity through more flexible operation, and, in particular, reductions in 
maintenance and engineering staff. This represents the main economic benefit (6). 
- the rapid growth in minibuses. Total cost per bus-kilometer (including capital costs) is around 65 
to 70% that of full-sized vehicles (10), allowing for lower purchase price, better fuel consumption 
and maintenance costs. The principal factor, however, is the lower driver wage rate, typically 20o/o 
below that for full-sized buses. This would explain much of the reduction in the average earnings for 
drivers in the industry as a whole mentioned above. 
1-Iowever, lower wages are also now being offered to new recruits for full-sized bus driving, and 
differentials by length of service are becoming more important than those associated with size of vehicle. As staff 
turnover continues, this will tend to lo\ver the weighted average wage rate to\vard the minibus figure. Such 
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reductions would not be possible without the significant levels of unemployment experienced during the 
deregulation period. 
Increased productivity of staff may be measured by the gain in bus-kilometers operated per member of 
staff: 29% in London, and 28% in the rest of Britain (Table 4). Total operating cost per bus kilometer fell more 
outside London {36%) than within it (20% ), since average earnings of bus staff in London did not fall, and the 
proportion of minibus operation was less. However, due to the disastrous fall in passengers boarding per bus 
kilometer outside London (above), passenger trips per member of staff- the main output divided by the largest 
single input - fell by 8% in the rest of Britain, but rose by 21 % in London. 
6. TRENDS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
In terms of public expenditure, substantial reductions have occurred. These are shown in table 5. 
'Revenue support' includes general support to service and fare levels prior to deregulation (in 1985/86) but after 
1986/7 only those payments to operators for tendered services and other costs associated with public transport 
activity in the local authorities and Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs). The latter include payments on 
administration, service publicity and - in the metropolitan area PTEs - certain inherited obligations, notably 
pensions. The 'revenue support' total shown here thus exceeds considerably that passed on to operators (see 
below). 
Table 5: Public expenditure on local bus services, Great Britain excluding London 
£ million at 1990/91 prices 
1985/6 1990/91 % Change 
Total revenue support 465 219 - 52.9 
CFCs 280 309 + 10.4 
FDR 147 145 - 1.4 
Education transport 284 263 - 7.4 
(England only) 
Total 1,176 936 - 20.4 
Derived from ref. 5 {Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7) (HMSO 1991 ), and annual public expenditure White Papers (education 
spending). 
'FDR' is the fuel duty rebate. 
'CFCs' are the concessionary fares compensation payments 
Education spending is for England only (the 1990/91 UK total being about £325m). 
The sharp reduction in revenue support is associated with the high proportion of bus kilometers 
registered to operate commercially in the deregulated areas (about 85o/o) and low prices for tendered services. 
Whether it permits true long run costs to be covered is another matter. 
In addition the concessionary fares compensation (CFC) payments must be included. Since deregulation, 
these have exceeded the revenue support payments to operators as the proportion of travel represented by 
concessionary pass holders (mostly pensioners) has grown, and the standard fare levels, vis a vis which 
compensation is paid, have increased in real terms. In rural areas, a small transitional grant was made available 
following deregulation to offset the probable loss of cross-subsidy. It ceased at the end of the 1989/90 financial 
year. 
The 'Fuel duty rebate' does not represent direct public spending as such, but remission of a tax that would 
otherwise be paid. 
The expenditure on educational travel is not normally shown in 'transport' statistics as such, nor 
considered as a 'subsidy' by operators, but is included here because it forms a substantial part of local authorities' 
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expenditure , especially in rural areas. It may take the form of buses run directly by the authority for 
schoolchildren, contract services by psv operators, and/or purchase of season tickets for such travel on scheduled 
bus and rail services. Since 1986, encouraged under the 1985 Act, such spending has been considered along with 
that on tendered services for public use in order to secure the best value for money. For example a tendered service 
in a rural area may be specified to cover schoolchild travel (otherwise met on a separate contract) and a public 
daytime service for shopping trips, etc. Depending on the manner in \Vhich budgets are allocated within an 
authority, merging of the two types of operation might appear to give lo\ver spending on public tendered services 
(as 'revenue support'), or in the educational transport budget. 
Given the increasingly severe pressure on local authority budgets (notably as a result of the poll tax) it 
is important to consider these forms of expenditure together. For example despite the substantial reduction in 
revenue support since deregulation operators are under pressure to accept reduced concessionary fare 
compensation, leading to abandonment of free travel facilities in some areas (notably in Tyne & Wear, and West 
Yorkshire) and increases in the cash fares charged to pass holders, thus reducing the mobility of low-income 
groups and affecting off-peak ridership. 
7. BUS INDUSTRY CASH FLOW AND FLEET RENEW AL 
From another viewpoint, such cash flows may be considered in terms of the local bus industry's income 
and expenditure. 
Table 6 shows such estimates for Great Britain excluding London. Operating costs are derived from the 
total bus kilometers shown in table 1, and unit costs in table3. The 'revenue support' figure, obtained directly (11 ), 
is that for money actually passing to operators - in 1990/91 for example, some £140 million compared with £219 
million on the 'public expenditure' definition. In real terms income from passengers fell substantially despite the 
large fare increases in the Mets., from over £1770 million in 1985/6 to£1630million in 1990/91. Coupled with lower 
revenue support, total income fell from £2160 million in 1985/6 to £1770 million in 1990/91. 
The reductions in unit cost enabled a drop in total operating costs (excluding depreciation) despite rising 
bus kilometers - from £2110 million in 1985/6 to £1640 million in 1990/91. As a result the net surplus initially rose 
from £50 million in 1985/6 to £70 million in 1987/8 but then to £120 million 1989/90. 
Note that the operating surplus would be wiped out if local bus services had to pay fuel tax since, it is less 
than the fuel duty rebate shown in table 5. 
On the figures which include depreciation (from 1987/8 only) a deficit of £10 million in 1987/8 rose to a 
surplus of £10 million in 1988/9, increasing to £90 million in 1989/90. 
Given the accuracy of unit cost data, the totals and net surplus estimates can only be approximate, but 
nonetheless the general picture is fairly clear. 
Although operators taken as a whole are covering operating costs (otherwise they would not be in 
business, one assumes) this picture is less rosy than at first appears. The depreciation figures are based on historic 
depreciation only, Dfil current replacement cost. Furthermore the surplus over operating cost must also meet 
equity returns on capital. 
Interest charges are included in operating cost returns, according to the Department of Transport's 
definitions on the statistics form completed by operators (form 'Stats lOOA'). In view of the highly-geared nature 
of most privatizations to date, it is likely that the element of equity return as such required from the total operating 
surplus is relatively small. Thus, the reduction in direct operating costs as such is slightly greater than may appear 
in the figures shown. 
The total sale price of NBC companies, excluding Victoria Coach Station, was about £170 million ( 4). If 
a 15°/o return were required, some £25m per year \vould be needed (mostly as fixed-interest payments), thus 
reducing the available surplus for investment. Similar costs arise from the PTC privatizations to date, and those 
of SBG companies no\V in progress. 
The high debt finance ratio also applies to some of the larger companies \Vhich have acquired former NBC 
fleets and not only management buy-outs as such. For example the Stagecoach group had a total capital of over 
£80m at the end of 1989/90 but only about £1 million was represented by equity holdings by the two main 
shareholders (Souter and Gloag) and some £68 million was held by 'creditors', mainly banks. 
Poor profitability in the industry as a \Vhole is confirmed in the Price Waterhouse study (12) suggesting 
a profit margin before interest and tax of only 5°/o in 1988, albeit an increase from 1 o/o in 1987: this matches the 
improvement shO\Vn in the net surplus after depreciation bet\veen 1987/8 and 1988/9 shO\Vn in table 6. 
In many of the PTCs a 'normal' rate of return on capital is not required by their owning authorities, and 
this enables them to sustain fleet replacement at a more realistic rate. However as James Isaac, Managing 
Director of West Midlands Travel, has pointed out, should such firms be privatized the additional interest charges 
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would make it difficult for this policy to be maintained. 
The total fleet employed in local bus services outside London is about 30,000 of which about 8,000 are 
minibuses. Assuming a life of 15 years and cost of £100,000 in 1990/91 for a full-sized bus; and 7 years and £35,000 
respectively for a minibus, total replacement costs per annum would be about £170m. The operating surplus 
shown in table 6 is clearly inadequate for this purpose. although some operators have been able to achieve profits 
sufficient to cover replacement cost depreciation, such as South Wales Transport (35). 
Table 6: Local bus industry cash Dow: Great Britain excluding London 
At 1990/91 prices,£ million 
1985/6 1987/8 1988/9 1989/90 1990/91 % 
Change 
85/6 to 
89/90 
Revenue from passengers 1770 1720 1670 1660 1630 - 18 
(of which concessionary 
fares compensation) (280) (290) (280) (290) (310) + 10 
Revenue support to 
operators 390 170 160 160 140 
- 64 
Rural Grant 
- 20 10 8 -
Total Income 2160 1910 1850 1800 1770 - 18 
Total cost 
excluding depreciation 2110 1840 1760 1710 1640 -22 
Surplus 50 70 90 120 120 
Total cost 
including depreciation 
- 1920 1840 1790 1680 
Surplus n/a -10 10 40 90 
PBIT (%) 
Price Waterhouse 1 5 
.. 
ICC 4.3 2.4 
Note: All ficuresrounded to nearest£10 million. All data from ref. 5, and unit costs as shown in table 3 (which 
have been multiplied by the numberof passengers, as shown in table 1, to estimate total costs), except 
for the 1985/6 revenue support at 1989/90 prices, which is calculated from data in ref.!. 
All adjustment to 1990/91 prices is by the GDP de Flator. 
'PBIT' represents profit before interest and taxation as a percentage of turnover, from the Price 
Waterhouse study (12), and ICC report (36). 
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Table 7: Operator cash Dow: London Transport (buses) 
At 1990/91 prices,£ million 
1985/6 1987/8 1988/9 1989/90 1990/91 % 
change 
85/6-
90/91 
Revenue from passengers 381 376 383 392 390 + 2% 
(of which concessionary 
fare compensation) (84) (87) (83) (91) (89) + 6% 
Capital Grant 54 25 29 30 28 +48% 
Income before 
revenue support 434 401 411 421 418 - 4% 
Bus Km run (m) 261 264 273 280 299 + 5% 
Cost per bus-km 
excl. dep. (pence) 208 183 178 169 165 - 21% 
Total op. cost 
excl. dep. (£m) 544 484 485 473 494 - 9% 
Cost per bus-km 
incl. dep. (pence) 225 197 192 473 494 
- 23% 
Total op. cost 
incl. dep. (£m) 587 521 524 507 521 - 11% 
Net revenue support 
required: 
-excluding dep. 110 82 73 52 76 - 31% 
-including dep. 152 120 113 86 103 - 32% 
Notes: Operations covered are bus services run on behalf of London Transport, (i.e. all tendered services by 
operators other than LBL; and all LBL operations, except for its 'Airbus' services and some other 
purely commercial operations). Conversion from money prices to 1990/91 values is by the retail prices 
index. 
The concessionary fare payments represent an estimate for that share to buses of the total LT 
concessionary expenditure. 
Source: LT annual reports, and LT group revenue accounts, with estimates from M H Fairhurst, Principal 
Economic Advisor. 
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The low level of demand for new buses confirms this picture. Given a full-sized bus and coach fleet of 
about 55,000 (5) one would expect about 4,000 new vehicles per year to be delivered, on the 15-year life typically 
assumed. However, data from SMMT- which exclude minibuses - show only 2630 buses and coaches delivered 
in 1990, with falling to 1861in1991 (13). Local bus deliveries as such, of full-sized single- and double-deck types, 
were about 1300 in 1990, including vehicles for service in London (25), giving a fleet renewal rate of about half 
the normal figure. This represents an investment of about £1 lOm by operators and lessors. Current orders for 
new vehicles remain at a very low level, with severe effects on the manufacturing sector. 
While it could be argued that the bus industry is in decline anyway, and hence full replacement levels are 
not needed, this was certainly not the stated aim of the 'Buses' White Paper in 1984. Given the growing interest 
in the role that buses might play in reducing urban traffic congestion, then at the very least the industry needs to 
be able to maintain the quality of its rolling stock, let alone invest in other facilities. An ageing fleet will lead to 
poorer passenger standards, and rising maintenance costs which will offset some of the savings made since 
deregulation. Innovations such as low-floor buses, and reduced energy consumption through lighter materials, 
will be introduced very slowly at the present rate of fleet renewal. 
8. THE LONDON CASE 
Table 7 shows a parallel cash flow estimate for bus services under the aegis of London Transport. In this 
case, a somewhat different financingstructure is adopted. Although a similar mechanism applies for concessionary 
fares compensation, a capital grant is also paid. Revenue support for buses as such is difficult to determine from 
published reports, and the table therefore adopts the pattern of showing income from passengers plus the capital 
grant, and comparing this with costs, to show the net revenue support required to break even. As mentioned 
above, London experienced a growth in ridership, compared with substantial decline elsewhere. This was also 
associated with a marginal growth in real total revenues (including concessionary compensation), which partly 
offset a virtual halving of the capital grant, to produce a 4% rise in real income before revenue support over the 
period analyzed. 
Cost per bus-kilometer fell by 21 % (excluding depreciation), or 23% if depreciation is included. As a 
result of the gro\vth in bus-kilometers run, a reduction of about 9% in total costs was obtained. Hence, net revenue 
support required fell by 31 % (excluding depreciation) or32%, including depreciation. This was not as sharp a fall 
as that in revenue support to deregulated operators (table 5), but represents a much greater reduction in cost per 
passenger (as shown in table 4). 
Given the better performance shown in London, it seems surprising that the government is now 
proposing to extend the deregulated approach found in the rest of Britain to the capital (2). The consultation 
paper makes misleading references to trends outside London in an attempt to justify this, and ignores the major 
problems of fleet renewal mentioned above. In many respects, London itself would seem a better model to follow, 
and this would appear to be the case elsewhere in Europe (see below). 
Having said this, some changes in London may be necessary. The present system remains highly 
centralized, and managers of the local subsidiaries of London Buses Ltd. undoubtedly would prefer greater 
autonomy. The tendering and planning system has evolved from a small unit at the center and has become a de 
facto regulator. Other operators may only participate in the Travelcard and concessionary fares schemes by 
agreement, even after obtaining local bus service licenses through the Traffic Commissioner. 
However, it is hard to see why such problems could justify wholesale deregulation on the pattern found 
elsewhere, especially given the dangers of instability in the pattern of service, and the exceptionally large decline 
in passenger trips (even after allowing for real fare increases) found in the metropolitan areas, the closest 
equivalent to London in type of network. Within the existing system, allocation of travelcard revenues (both to 
LBL subsidiaries, and newcomers) at local level, coupled with a·requirement for all operators to participate in 
the Travelcard scheme, could alleviate the minor problems now found without risking the damage that complete 
deregulation would probably cause. 
9. LOCAL CASE STUDIES 
Table 8 extends the national aggregate trends shown earlier, by assembling a range of published case 
studies, covering both 'on the road' competition, and service enhancement through minibus conversion. Much 
of the material is derived from work by Prof. Andrew Evans of University College London. Most cases fall within 
the 'English shires' category, in which the overall changes between 1985/6 and 1989/90 comprised a growth in bus-
kilometers of 23o/o and fall in patronage of 8%, leading to a fall in bus occupancy of 25%. 
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Table 8: Case-studies of bus competition: changes in service levels, patronage and bus occupancy 
Service Patron Bus Fare Bus Period Notes 
Area or Route Level -age Occu- Reduc Type 
or Operator % % pancy tion? 
Competition Case-Studies 
(a) 
Preston +118 +4 -52 No m 87-88 (b) 
Stockton +76 +O -43 No F 86-87 (c) 
Morecambe +107 -2 -53 No m 86-87 (c) 
Lancaster +111 -8 -57 No m 86-87 
Whitehaven (d) 
- Woodhouse +c225 +c55 -c40 No m 86-87 
- Egremont & (e) 
Cleator Moor +c480 +c190 -c40 Yes F 86-87 (f) 
-combined result +237 +99 -41 
(g) 
Hereford +60 +30 -18 Yes F 83-85 (h) 
Inverness +173 +25 -54 Yes m 88-89 
Glasgow- (i) 
Easterhouse +50 +21 -20 No F 86-87 
Blackbum- (j) 
Accrington +57 -7 -41 Yes F 86-87 (k) 
Portsmouth +20 -35 -46 No F 86-89 
(l) 
Maidstone 0 -20 -20 No F 86-88 
Minibus conversions 
(m) 
Bristol City Line +69 +25 -26 No M 85-88 (m) 
Badgerline +51 +10 -28 No M 85-88 
South Wales Tpt (n) 
- West Glamorgan +22 -1 -18 No M 86-89 (o) 
- West Swansea +143 +73 -29 No M 87-88 (p) 
Newbury +100 +40 -30 No M 87-88 
Notes: The change in service level is that in bus-kilometers per period. The change in patronage is that in 
passenger trips observed per period. Note that data for service level is generally more reliable than that 
for patronage, given the short survey periods used. 'Bus Occupancy' is the passenger trips divided by 
bus kilometers. Under 'fare reduction', "yes" indicates significant reductions by some or all competing 
operators. Unfortunately, an overall index is not available. 
Under 'bus type', "F" indicates that operation before and after the onset of competition, or change 
in service level, was \Vholly or largely by full-sized vehicles; "m" indicates that some minibus 
conversion \Vas introduced ; typically by one operator in a competitive situation; and "M" indicates 
complete minibus conversion, by the same operator. 
'Period' sho\vs, in years, the period over \Vhich observations occurred. 
Specific notes : 
(a) From Preston & Mackie (22). New minibus operator 'Zippy' (United Transport) in competition 
\Vith incumbent Preston Transport (PTC), \vho also introduced minibuses. 
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(b) From TRRLReport283 (23). Intensive competition between incumbent Cleveland Transit (PTC) 
and United (ex-NBC), and newcomers (TMS, Delta). Combined data for the two observation 
sites (North Tees Hospital and Bishopton Lane). 
( c) From Evans (24 ), using data provided byTRRL. Lancaster City (PTC) in competition with Ribble 
(ex NBC) who converted some routes to minibuses during this period. 
( d) From TRRL Report RR 282 (26). Competition between incumbent Cumberland Motor Services 
(ex NBC) and independents, with CMS converting to minibus on Woodhouse route (town 
service). Data from graphs, comparing October 1986 with October 1987. 
(e) As (d), on routes to Egremont and Cleator Moor. 
(f) Weighted average from Whitehaven, from A.W. Evans. 
(g) From Mills (27), covering competition between Midland Red West (NBC) and independents, all 
using full-sized buses, under 'Trial Area' status before general deregulation. 
(h) From MMC study (28). Incumbent Highland Omnibus (SBG) and newcomer Inverness Traction, 
the latter with minibuses. 
(i) From Scottish Development Department study (29). Intensive full-sized bus competition on 
route between high-density housing area and Glasgow city center. 
(j) From Alamdari and Cross (30) 
(k) From MMC Study (31),pp 20,38,60. Service level and patronage data is for Portsmouth City Bus 
(PTC) and Stagecoach (Southdown) in the Portsmouth & Havant reference area. However, the 
patronage data exclude the Red Admiral minibus operation. This leads to some exaggeration of 
total patronage Joss in the area (which was probably around 30% ), and also of the drop in 
occupancy rate. 
(1) Data from Turner & White (33). Results of a household trip frequency survey to produce 
weighted average trip rate change. Similar service level along Tonbridge Road was provided by 
Maidstone Boro'Line (PTC) and Maidstone & District (ex NBC), but no longer as a joint service: 
loss of co-ordinated timetable and common ticketing. 
(m) MMC study (34). Extensive conversions by ex-NBC operators (subsequently re-merged) to 
minibuses, with little direct competition. 
(n) From publication by operator (35) and data supplied by Managing Director A.D.Kreppel. 
Operations in whole West Glamorgan area by this ex-NBC company, comprising Swansea and 
adjoining region. Many routes converted to minibuses. 
( o) Conversion of West Swansea network wholly to minibuses. 
(p) Conversion of cross-town service by incumbent Bee Line Berks Bucks (ex-NBC) from full-sized 
bus to minibus. 
The sample is not necessarily a representative one, since those cases covered in detailed case studies are 
mainly those in which on-the-road competition developed, and/or intensive minibus conversion took place. 
Relatively stable service levels are thus under-represented. 
Although high service increases are found, there are far fewer case of ridership increases. Encouraging 
growth in total ridership is shown in Whitehaven, Hereford, Inverness and Glasgow-Easterhouse. However, bus 
occupancy generally displays a greater loss than the national average, except in the cases of Hereford and 
Easterhouse. But in the Hereford case, fare reductions also occurred, which would have caused revenue per bus-
kilometer to fall substantially more than the occupancy rate. 
In many other cases, total ridership fell or displayed only a very modest increase (Preston, Stockton) 
despite a large growth in bus-kilometers, leading to very sharp falls in bus occupancy, typically around 50%. 
Exceptionally severe instability in Portsmouth produced the worst total ridership decline, of about 30%. 
The Maidstone example offers an illustration of the effects of removing co-ordination (rather than 
competition per se), with a broadly unchanged service level. Simply removing common public timetabling, and 
interavailable tickets, caused a ridership loss of about 20% (most remaining passengers still took the first bus to 
arrive, but in order to do so while making a round trip, shifted from returns or travelcards to single cash-paid fares 
: in effect, a real fares increase for the same service level). 
However, where services were converted largely or wholly to minibus operation by the same operator, 
a much more positive picture is generally found. Under the same overall organizational efficiency, minibus costs 
per km. (including capital costs) are around 65 to 70% those offull-size buses,assuming that the usual driver wage 
differential of20% applies (10). Where high-frequency minibuses replace full-size buses to give a growth in total 
ridership, a bus occupancy loss of about 25% to 30% is perfectly acceptable as part of this trade-off, since 
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profitability is maintained. This is the case in the Bristol area, Swansea and Newbury. 
The evidence would seem to suggest that service level increases in a fairly stable environment may 
produce substantial traffic growth, as one might assume through typical elasticities of about +0.4. However, where 
the service level increase is from a high initial base, and/or coincides with instability associated with on-the-road 
competition, and frequent changes in routes and timetables, the result in terms of average loadings can be 
disastrous. 
A further notable example of ridership growth due to_ minibus conversion is the pioneer network of 
Devon General in Exeter. Since the first conversions in 1984, total ridership has risen from about 14,000 to about 
40,000 per day, or almost 200% (14). 
These results do not necessarily indicate that minibuses will produce the same effect in all instances: the 
growth is likely to be greater where previous service levels were very low. In particular, high-density corridors 
in large cities already enjoy good frequencies, further enhancement of which is unlikely to produce much growth. 
There is also evidence of successful minibus conversions in Swansea and Newbury producing substantial 
diversion from the car- about 50o/o of the additional minibus passengers in these cases were former car occupants 
(15). 
Application of cost-benefit methodology to minibus conversions of low-frequency full-sized operation 
confirms substantial economic benefits (32). 
10. PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 
Few countries seem inclined to follow the British model directly. The main exceptions are New Zealand, 
which is currently introducing a similar system, albeit with some changes in the light of British experience, and 
the Republic of Ireland, in which a de facto deregulation of long-distance coaches has already occurred. However, 
there are few signs of major industrialized countries following this trend. 
A more common pattern lies in attempts to reduce operating costs and improve efficiency through a 
system of competitive tendering, as found in London. This can be seen in a number of American cities, current 
plans for Oslo, and policies already implemented for Copenhagen. It is of particular interest to note that the 
Copenhagen authority, HT, recently advertised in the bus and coach technical press in Britain, inviting British 
operators to bid for the next 10°k of the network being contracted. The EC is also working on a common standard 
for competitive tendering in public transport. 
The overall experience of deregulation in Britain clearly suggests that direct imitation is unwise. 
However, certain specific applications may be worth following, in particular the use of minibuses to improve 
services where current frequencies are low, and unemployment enables workers to be recruited at lower wages 
than standard bus rates. While large cities elsewhere in Europe often compare favorably with their British 
counterparts in terms of public transport, this is not necessarily the case in smaller towns, where full-size buses 
offer poor frequencies. Many European regions currently have high unemployment, and creating additional jobs 
in this way (even at low wages) may be preferable to the economic and political consequences of high 
unemployment - in the eastern lander of Germany, for example. Such a policy need not be permanent, since 
minibuses have a relatively short life. However, greater flexibility in agreeing wages and working conditions will 
be necessary for such innovation to occur. 
One of the most interesting parallels with Britain is in Chile, where bus deregulation was introduced in 
the late 1970s. However, in Santiago the effects as documented by Fernandez et al (20) appear very worrying. A 
static total market is now served by many more operators, leading to a halving of passengers carried per vehicle 
per annum - an extension of the trend in bus occupancy already found in Britain. Despite an ability of the operators 
to act as a cartel in pushing up prices, profitability is insufficient to justify adequate fleet replacement, and "re-
regulation" is now proposed. A further analysis (21) suggests that an equilibrium situation does not necessarily 
develop. Dependent upon the passengers' value of time, it may be possible for operators even in a highly 
competitive situation to push up real fares, leading to considerable losses in consumer surplus. 
11. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ON DEREGULATION IN BRITAIN 
Both the aggregate statistics, and individual case studies, indicate that the general effect of deregulation 
has been to produce useful savings in unit operating costs. However, despite substantial growth in total bus-
kilometers run, ridership has fallen by roughly the percentage that would have been expected, given the real fares 
increases and underlying trend decline. In other words, the net aggregate benefit of additional kilometers run 
seems to be zero. This growth in kilometers offsets much of the reduction in unit costs, so that total cost reductions 
have been much smaller. 
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Two notable contrasts exist. First of all, successful minibus conversions, and some other cases of increased 
frequency, have stimulated greater ridership. These are offset by the effects of instability elsewhere. Clearly, the 
stimulus given by competition (or, more often, the threat thereof) to the improved service levels has produced 
worthwhile results, but the instability associated with 'on the road' competition has been very damaging. 
London, in which a system of competitive tendering under a regulated framework has been adopted, 
forms an experimental case in which much better aggregate results can be seen - a net growth in ridership, and 
much greater reduction in cost per passenger trip than elsewhere. 
Despite the fall in unit costs, profitability in the deregulated sector of the industry is poor. This is a result 
of revenue losses through instability, and higher service levels which often result in very low occupancy levels. As 
I suggested at Thredbo, an 'optimistic' outcome could be one in which some of the unproductive excess service 
is cut out, leading to improved profitability for the remainder, with, hopefully, little loss of ridership. 
Although the aggregate data indicates that net growth in total bus-kilometers was still occurring up to 
1989/90 inclusive, cases can now be seen of a 'shake out' in excess mileage - for example, in the Manchester area. 
The rapid growth in total bus-kilometers run has tailed off, \vith a very marginal drop of under 1 o/o (outside 
London) between 1989/90 and 1990/91. 
This 'shake out' may take several forms: 
- one operator withdrawing entirely, 
- a joint working agreement (although OFI' rules tend to discourage this), 
- the de facto equivalent, 
- or an agreed merger between operators. 
Unfortunately, some government policies tend to discourage such natural processes. Investigation of 
mergers and anti-competitive behavior quite rightly aims to identify cases of predatory competition, in which a 
newcomer is unfairly treated by an incumbent. However, it is difficult to see why the same attention should be 
paid to agreed mergers where both operators need to improve profitability, save for the sake of competition as 
a dogmatic objective its O\vn right. For example, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission has recently 
investigated such agreed mergers in Sheffield (16), the Warwick/Leamington area (17), and Teesside (18) -
generally some time after services had been rationalized and operations restructured. In the Warwick/Leamington 
case, the merger of ex-NBC area operator Midland Red South, and local independent G&G Travel was approved. 
In the Sheffield case, the acquisition by South Yorkshire Transport (the PTC) of several independents was judged 
against the public interest, and SYT ordered to divest itself of the acquired companies. In the Teesside case, 
Caldaire North East had acquired Trimdon Motor Services (TMS). This left substantial competition remaining 
in Cleveland (which includes the Stockton case shown in table 7), butless so in parts of County Durham. However, 
the MMC were content to suggest certain restrictions on Caldaire to discourage anti-competitive behavior, rather 
than require divestment. 
The Secretary State for Trade and Industry overruled the MMC in the Caldaire case , as his predecessor 
had done in Portsmouth, requiring divestment. Both the Sheffield and Caldaire cases are subject to judicial 
reviews requested by the operators concerned. Caldaire, in particular, has stressed the need to improve 
profitability as a means of funding adequate fleet renewal, and protested strongly at the Secretary of State's 
decision (19). In the Sheffield case, a judgement has been given, invalidating the whole basis of the MMC enquiry, 
in that it did not relate to a 'substantial' area. An appeal against this judgement also found in favor of SYT. The 
government has to consider whether an appeal to the House of Lords would be justified.No further MMC studies 
have been completed since the appeal case. 
Such divestment, if imposed, will lead to further service instability, and adversely affect operator 
profitability. By discouraging other similar mergers, it may have the effect of causing smaller operators to 
withdraw entirely, where the market is not sufficient to sus~t.ain competition at adequate profitability levels. 
Greater encouragement to voluntary co-operation between operators in the deregulated region would 
also assist in providing better passenger information, through ticketing and more efficient timetabling. 
POSTSCRIPT 
The original text of this paper as delivered at Tampere, has been updated to include 1990/91 data, and 
cross-references to recent published work. However, these do not change the conclusions reached. 
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